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ERIC TOPONCE 
Removing Remedies, Removing Rights; TheFuture of 1983 Claims for Violations of 
the IDEA in the Wake of Gonzaga v. Doe 
Removing Remedies, Removing Rights: The Future of 
8 1983 Claims for Violations of the IDEA in the Wake of Gonzaga v. Doe 
Congress signed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") into law with 
the express intent that individuals with disabilities receive a free and appropriate public 
education that is designed to meet their individual needs. ' When a child with a disability does 
not receive an education in accordance with the provisions of the IDEA, their parents or 
guardians may use administrative procedures outlined in the IDEA to ensure that a school 
complies with the Act's goals.2 Sometimes, however, merely requiring the school to change its 
noncompliant behavior or repay parents the educational costs that they were forced to expend in 
the appropriate education of their child is not enough? In circumstances where parents believe 
the limited scope of remedies construed to be available under the IDEA is inadequate: the use of 
42 U.S.C. 1983 ("5 1983"); among other laws: has garnered special appeal. The courts, 
however, have split on the issue of whether 42 U.S.C. $1983 is available to plaintiffs seeking to 
' 20 U.S.C. $ 5  1400-1419 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The IDEA was originally enacted as the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EHA) Pub. L. No. 94-142,89 Stat. 773 (1975). This Note will refer to PL 94-142 
primarily as the IDEA, regardless of the title in use at the time the relevant decision or statute was passed. 
3 
20 U.S.C. 5 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
See School Committee of Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359,369 (1985) ( a f f i g  
that injunctive relief and reimbursement of certain unjustly incurred educational expenses are included within the 
broad grant of remedies conferred by Congress.) 
4 Seegenerally Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,1020 (1984). Although not expressing an opinion on the matter, 
the Supreme Court noted that, "Courts generally agree [that] damages are.. .available under the EHA only in 
exceptional circumstances." 
42 U.S.C. $ 1983 is a statutory vehicle that allows plaintiffs whose Constitutional or federal rights are violated to 
sue for a remedy in federal court. This Note will hereafter intermittently refer to 42 U.S.C. 1983 as Section 1983. 
20 U.S.C. $ 1415 (I) (1994 & Supp V 1999). Congress amended 5 1415 of the IDEA in 1986 to add, ''Nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed to restrict or l i t  the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the 
Constitutioh the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C.A. 5 I2101 et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. $ 791 et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, 
except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this 
subchapter, the procedures under subsections (0 and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as 
would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter." Following this amendment, plaintiffs have 
sued for remedies that had been held unavailable by alleging concurrent violations of $504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
and 42 U.S.C. 1983 among others. 
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allege a statutory violation of the  IDEA.^ 
This Note will explore whether 5 1983 is available under the IDEA and to what extent a 
recent Supreme Court decision, Gonzaga v. ~ o e , 8  may influence the current circuit court split on 
the issue. Part I provides a brief overview of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and 
its nexus with the current controversy over whether a claim for a violation of the IDEA may be 
made under 5 1983. Part I1 discusses the various decisions reached by the circuit courts in 
addressing this question. Part I11 examines 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 and the treatment it has received by 
the Supreme Court up and through its decision in Blessing v. Freestone. Part IV analyzes a 
frequently litigated IDEA provision in light of the Supreme Court's $1983 jurisprudence and 
concludes that 5 1983 is available to plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA. Part V 
evaluates the circuit court decisions that have found $1983 to be unavailable and discusses 
possible analytical errors these courts may have made in reaching their decisions. Part VI 
considers the holdings of the latest 5 1983 Supreme Court case, Gonzaga v. Doe, and the 
possible significance this decision may have in directing future decisions regarding the 
applicability of 5 1983 for violations of the IDEA. Finally, part VII concludes that, although $ 
1983 should have been readily perceived by the circuits as available to plaintiffs suing upon 
statutory violations of the IDEA prior to Gonzaga, that decision now casts doubt onto this 
conclusion. 
7 The First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have implied that plaintiffs may, theoretically, sue 
for violations of the IDEA. The Second and Thirds Circuits have explicitly so held, and the Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits have implied such a holding should one of several conditions be met. Two Circuits, the Tenth and Fowth, 
have rejected the idea that plaintiffs may use $1983 to sue for statutory violations of the IDEA. 
536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
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I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act9 (IDEA) seeks to ensure that children 
with disabilities receive a fke  and appropriate education,I0 individualized to meet each child's 
unique educational needs. Under the IDEA, every student with an eligible disability1' is entitled 
to an individualized program of special education1' and related services within the least 
restrictive environment1'. These goals are achieved as the result of each state's implementation 
of the IDEA in exchange for federal funding. l4 
Although every state is now obligated1' to provide a free, appropriate public education 
('TAPE') to students within their state who have disabilities, it was the ~nwi l l in~ness '~  or 
financial inability1' of states to adequately provide for the educational needs of these students 
that originally led to the creation of the IDEA". Prior to the enactment of the IDEAI~ in 1975, 
See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
l o  20 U.S.C. 5 1412 (a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1999). 
" Id. 5 1401 (3)(A)(i). 
l 2  Id, 5 1414 (d). The IDEA requires that each student with a disability have in place individualized educational 
programming (IEP) that is decided upon, assessed by, and facilitated through an individualized education program 
team IEP teams are comprised of the student (if appropriate), the student's parents or guardians, special and regular 
educators, a representative fiom the local educational agency, related service personnel, and other persons who have 
knowledge or special expertise regarding the child. 
I' Id. 5 1412 (a)(5). A child is educated in the least restrictive environment when they are educated to the maximum 
extent appropriate with their nondisabled peers. Students may not be segregated and placed in alternate schools, 
classes, or settings that are not equally occupied by their nondisabled peers unless education with supplemenmy 
aids and supports cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 
" ~ d .  at 5 1412 (a). 
l5  New Mexico Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847 (10" Cir. 1982). New Mexico was the 
last state to opt to accept federal funding in exchange for implementing IDEA. 
l 6  See infra notes 21 and 23 and accompanying text. 
" S. REP. NO. 94-168 (1975). reprinted in 1975 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1431. The Senate noted that despite 36 court cases in 
the states recognizing the rights of the handicapped to an appropriate education and an effort by the states to comply, 
lack of financial resources have prevented states from implementing these various decisions. 
See Notes 21 and 23 In]% regarding two court cases that proved pivotal in creating a fluny of litigation that 
eventually led to congressional interest in investigating the education of students with disabilities; See generally 
Edwin Martin, et al., The Legislative and Litigation History ofSpecial Education, q 1 )  SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES, (Spring 1996). available at http://www.futureofchi1dren.org/usr~doc/vol6nol 
ART2.pdfz. 
19 See supra note 1. The IDEA was originally entitled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 
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more than half of all children with disabilities had special educational needs which were not 
being met." One reason that these educational needs were not met was because state legislation 
prevented students with disabilities from attending public schoo~s.~' 
Congress, in its findings, noted that over one million such children had not received any 
form of public educati~n.'~ Of the children who did attend school, many of the schools they 
attended were private, far from home, and at a cost to their parents.23 Seeking to ensure that the 
goals they effectuated in the IDEA were safeguarded and made available to each individual 
student, Congress incorporated procedural safeguards and impartial due process procedures into 
its enactment of the  IDEA.^ 
To remain eligible for federal funding under the IDEA, a state must provide the Secretary 
of Education with an annual plan that details policies and procedures it has effectuated in accord 
with the provisions of the  IDEA^'. One such required procedure is that parents and students 
have notice of, and access to, the IDEA'S safeguardsz6 Procedural safeguards ensure students a 
free and appropriate public education by securing their parents with the right to be an informed 
participant27 in its development and implementation. Should this right be denied, the procedural 
safeguards also provide parents with the opportunity to have this denial impartially reviewed2* 
20 20 U.S.C. 5 1400 (c)(2)(a)-(b)(Supp. V 1999). 
21 See, e.g., Pennsylvania ~ s s o c i a t i k  for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,282-83 
(1972). Plaintiffs contested a state law that effectively barred children with mental retardation from public 
classrooms by requiring that all students possess the mental capacity of a five year old prior to being admitted. 
- .  
2Z 20 U.S.C. 5 1400 (c)(~)(c) (Supp. V 1999). 
23 Id. 5 1400 (c)(2)(E); See also Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C., 
1972) wherein the Court held that denying plaintiffs, students with disabilities, an equal educational o p p o d t y  due 
to school budget constraints to he a violation of the 14" Amendment's equal protection clause. 
" 20 U.S.C. $1415 (Supp. V 1999). 
"Id. 5 1412 (a). 
26 Id. 5 1412 (a)(6). 
"Id. 5 1415 (b)(1),(3),(4). 
See id. at $5 1415 (e) (Mediation); 1415(f) (impartial due process hearing); 1415(g) (appeal of the impartial due 
process hearing), 1415(i)(2) (a civil action); 1415 (k)(6)(A)(i) (manifestation determination hearing). 
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and rectified29. 
Generally, the IDEA procedural safeguards mandate that parents: (1) be informed of any 
possible changes in the identification, evaluation, instruction, and placement of their child3' and 
be given the opportunity to participate in individualized educational planning meetings regarding 
these changes3'; (2) be able to examine the educational records of their ~ h i l d ; ~ ~ a n d  (3) seek 
impartial review of any educational decisions or actions which the parent believes to be a 
violation of the  IDEA.^^ In regard to the last of these, the IDEA provides parents and students 
the opportunity to seek redress of the IDEA violations in both administrative and judicial 
settings.34 
Children with disabilities, and their parents, may seek redress for a violation of the IDEA 
through a series of steps. First, a parent must be offered the opportunity to settle the dispute via 
mediation." If the parent chooses not to utilize mediation, an impartial due process hearing must 
be provided.'6 An impartial due process hearing is an administrative hearing that is cqnducted 
by the local educational agency. The decision of the reviewing officer is final unless appealed. 
Families and schools have many of the same rights and responsibilities in a due process 
proceeding as they would in a civil action. For example, parents may choose to be represented 
by legal counsel, require certain persons be present, and cross-examine witness?' Should the due 
process hearing conducted by the local educational agency result in a decision that the parent 
"Id. at $1415(i)(2)(B)(3); §1415(i)(3)(B); §1415(1) 
Mid. at $1415 (b)(3). 
'' Id. at $1415 (b)(l). 
32 Id. 
" Id. at $1415(f). 
%Id. at §1415(1). The right to bring a civil action is conditioned upon the exhaustion of all administrative 
rocedures. 
Id. at $1415 (e)(Z)(A)(i). 
'61d. at $1415(f). 
'' Id. $ 1415 (h)(l)-(2). 
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believes to be incorrect, they may appeal this decision to the state?' An appeal to the state 
educational agency results in an impartial review of the record and a second decision either 
reversing or affirming the findings of the local educational agency. Should the state again hold 
adversely to the parent and student, this decision may be appealed to either a state or district 
The safeguards and due process procedure established through the IDEA have allowed 
many families to ensure that Congress's goal of providing a free and appropriate education to 
students with disabilities is a living reality for their child. An early and continuing problem, 
however, is whether parents and students who have been harmed by the local educational 
agency's violation of IDEA have adequate remedies available to them under the IDEA. The 
IDEA does not speak to the relief that may be found appropriate at the administrative 
proceeding. At the judicial level, however, the IDEA specifies that courts may grant "such relief 
as the Court determines is appropriate.'*0 An early case examining the appropriateness of one 
form of requested relief, attorney's fees, is Smith v. ~ o b i n s o n . ~ '  The decision in Smith and 
Congress' response to it forms the heart of the debate as to whether 42 U.S.C. 1983 might be 
available to plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA. 
B. Smith v. Robinson and the 1986 Amendments to IDEA 
Thomas Smith, a child with cerebral palsy, received what was agreed to be a free and 
appropriate public education at a day program conducted by a hospital in his hometown. For one 
year, the school district partially funded the tuition the program required in order for Thomas to 
attend. The following year, however, the school rehsed to provide any financial assistance and 
3 8 ~ d .  §1415(g). 
39 Id. §1415(i)(2). 
40 Id. § 14 15(i)(2)(B)(3). 
4 '  468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
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the Smiths began to pursue their due process rights under the IDEA. Four years after their 
struggle began, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found for the Smiths and granted injunctive 
relief!2 
Though gratified by the Court's ruling, the Smiths also wanted to be reimbursed for the 
attorney's fees they expended in their four-year struggle to assure Thomas the rights guaranteed 
to him under the IDEA. Although the IDEA did not explicitly provide for attomey's fees, 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did. 
Filing in federal Court, the Smiths argued that their claims, though addressed under the IDEA, 
were equally actionable and formed a substantial basis for finding a remedy under 5 504 and $ 
1988. Because both of these statutes allow for attorney's fees, the Smiths argued that the Court 
should award attomey's fees in their case. The First Circuit Court denied their claims and the 
Smiths appealed. 
The United States Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the First Circuit, held that the 
Smiths were not entitled to attorney's fees under the IDEA, 5 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or 5 
1988 of the Civil Rights Act. According to the Supreme Court, the IDEA provided the 
"exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly 
financed special educa t i~n . '~~  The comprehensive administrative procedures promulgated under 
the IDEA, according to the Court's opinion, were indicative of Congress' intent that the IDEA 
should provide the sole remedy and procedure for addressing complaints such as those presented 
in As a result, the Smiths and other plaintiffs seeking remedies available under statutes 
such as 5 504 and 5 1988 who present facts which would allow them relief under the IDEA, were 
barred from seeking relief by recourse to any statute other than the IDEA. 
42 See Smith v. Cumberland School Committee, 703 F.2d 4 (la' Cir. 1983). 
43 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984). 
Id. 
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On August 5, 1986, Congress passed the Handicapped Children's Protection Act 
("HcPA")~~ and effectively superseded the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. ~obinson!~ 
The HCPA amended the procedural safeguards available under the IDEA to include a provision 
that allows a court to award attorney's fees!' In addition, Congress added a separate provision 
to clarify that nothing within the procedural safeguards section should be construed as limiting 
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, Title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act, or any other Federal statute that seeks to protect the rights of children with 
disabilities. The only exception to this rule, the new provision notes, is the requirement that 
plaintiffs must first exhaust all administrative procedures before filing a civil action.48 While the 
4 9 .  . first of these amendments has caused a little stir, it is the second amendment, concerning a 
plaintiffs rights, remedies, and procedures under the Constitution and as established by federal 
law, that has caused the largest disagreement among the courts.50 
The remedies available under the IDEA have been narrowly construed by the courts. 
Attorney's fees, the relief sought in the Smiths' second suit, were initially held unavailable under 
the IDEA because the statute did not explicitly provide for them. Under what is termed the 
"American Rule," attorney's fees may not be awarded unless they are provided for in the statute 
sued upon.51 Other remedies, such as compensatory and punitive damages, have also been 
*' PUB. L. NO. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
46 See, e.g., Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 805 F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir.1986) and 
Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748,754 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that Congress effectively overruled the Supreme 
Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson). 
" 20 U.S.C. 5 1415 (i)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1999). 
" ld. 5 1415 (1). 
"See, e.g., Stefan Hudson, ARTICLE: Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys' Fees: Time for a 
Congressional Response Again, 2003 B W  Educ. & L. J. 519 (2003).Controversy exists regarding what constitutes 
a "prevailing party" to whom fees are awardable as well as to the application of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Buckhannon Ed. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't ofHealth & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (U.S. 2001) to litigation 
conducted under IDEA. 
See Pan I1 infra. 
51 See Alyeska Pipeline Sew. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,249 (1975) (describing the American Rule). 
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widely interpreted as unavailables2 under the IDEA'S grant of "appropriate" relief." The lack of 
a damages remedy under the IDEA has led many plaintiffs to rely on Congress' second and less 
clear provision in HCPA, that nothing within the safeguards section of the IDEA should be 
construed as limiting the remedies available to children with disabilities to seek damages outside 
of IDEA, or under other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 is one statute that plaintiffs have relied 
upon, with results varying by circuit, to receive an award for damages. 
11. Understanding the Split in the Circuits 
The circuits are divided as to whether $1983 is available to plaintiffs suing for a violation 
of the IDEA. The Second and Third Circuits have explicitly held that $1983 may be used to sue 
for violations of the  IDEA.^^ The Tenth and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand, have held that 
$1983 is not available to plaintiffs who are claiming a violation of IDEA. The remaining circuits 
have implied, but not explicitly held, that $1983 is available in limited circumstances to plaintiffs 
suing for violations of the JDEA.~' 
The Second and Third Circuits rely upon the HCPA amendment to the IDEA and its 
legislative history to find that $1983 is available to plaintiffs alleging violations of IDEA. The 
Third circuit, in KB. v. M u t u l ~ , ~ ~  held that the mother of a child with disabilities was entitled to 
a suit using $1983 to recover for procedural and substantive violations of the IDEA. The mother 
in Matula repeatedly requested that the school evaluate her child for special education services. 
The school failed to evaluate the child and, in so doing, failed to further provide him with the 
FAPE guaranteed by the IDEA to children with disabilities. Without specifically finding that the 
"See, e.g., Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205,1209 (7' Cir. 1981). One of two early cases to fust analyze 
$1415 of the IDEA and conclude that it does not permit an award of damages. These early cases established judicial 
recedent that damages are not available under the IDEA. 
20 USCS 5 1415 (i)(Z)(B) (Supp. V 1999). 
"Mr. & Mrs. B. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987) and W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding 5 
1983 to be available to plaintiffs suing for violations of the IDEA). 
IS See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
56 67 F.3d 484,493-94 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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IDEA conferred the plaintiff with enforceable rights, the Court held that Congress had 
specifically sought to allow access to $1983 when it enacted the HCPA in response to the 
Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Robinson. 
The Tenth and Fourth Circuits have found the reasoning of the Second and Third Circuits 
uncompelling. The Tenth Circuit's Sellers v. The School Board of the City of Manassas 
exemplifies the reasoning employed by these circuits in holding 5 1983 to be unavailable to 
plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA." The Sellers Court relied on four sources 
in drawing its conclusion that $1983 was unavailable: (1) the language of the HCPA amendment; 
(2) the legislative history; and (3) Pennhurst v. Halderman 's holding that obligations imposed 
upon states pursuant to federal spending legislation must be unambiguously stated if they are to 
be enforced. 
First, the Court held that the 1986 amendment to IDEA did not explicitly preserve a 
plaintiffs right to $ 1983.~' Instead, the statute references protecting access to 'other' statutes 
that protect the rights of children with disabilities. Reasoning that 5 1983 is a statute of general 
enforcement, the Court held that Congress was not refemng to 5 1983 when it enacted HCPA, a 
statute that referred, at least in part, to statutes enacted singularly to protect the rights of the 
disabled. Second, reviewing the legislative history, the Court found that the senate report which 
the plaintiffs relied upon to explicitly preserve use of $1983 could equally be interpreted to 
simply preserve a plaintiffs right to sue for Constitutional rather than statutory violations using 
$1983.'~ Finally, the Court relied upon Pennhurst v. Halderman to hold that the ambiguous 
'' 141 F.3d 524 (lorn Cir. 1998). 
"Id. at 530. 
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nature of the 1986 amendment precluded its enforcement against the states.60 
Implying that plaintiffs may, theoretically, sue under $1983 for violations of IDEA are 
the First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Each of these Circuits has limited 
a plaintiffs access to $1983 based upon the plaintiff either failing to exhaust the administrative 
remedies available to them6' or the fact that they are suing for money damages; a remedy widely 
held unavailable under the  IDEA.^^ Theoretically then, it appears that a plaintiff who has 
exhausted their administrative remedies in the first case, or is suing for relief other than damages 
in the second instance, should be able to use $1983 to sue for a violation of the IDEA. 
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie 
School District 68 is representative of the circuits which limit a plaintiffs access to $1983 based 
upon whether or not the administrative remedies available under IDEA were appropriately 
exhausted.63 The plaintiff, Charlie, was a fourth grade boy who had panic attacks and attention 
deficit disorder (ADD). His teacher "invited her pupils to express their complaints about 
Charl ieand they all too willingly obliged, leading to humiliation, fistfights, mistrust, loss of 
confidence and self-esteem, and disruption of Charlie's educational progress.'a Following 
Charlie's move to another school, his parents initiated a suit under $ 1983 for the violation of 
Charlie's right to a FAF'E. Seeing as how Charlie was receiving a FAPE at the time the suit was 
filed, his parents sought only damages as relief. Since damages were not available under the 
60 Id.; Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) provides that spending clause 
legislation, in order to be enforceable against the states, must affirmatively and unambiguously set forth rights and 
obligations. 
61 See Kate Frazier v. Fairhaven School Committee, 276 F.3d 52 (1" Cir. 2002); Charlie F. v. Board of Education of 
Skokie School District, 98 F. 3d 989 (7' Cir. 1996); Robb v. Bethel School District #403,308 F.3d 1047 (9* Cir. 
2002); N.B. v. Alachua County School Board, 84 F.3d 1376 (1 1' Cir. 1996). 
62 See Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 980 F.2d 382 (6' Cir. 1992); Bradley v. 
Arkansas Department of Education, 301 F.3d 952 (8' Cir. 2002). 
63 98 F.3d 989 (7' Cir. 1996). 
Id. at 990. 
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IDEA, his parents claimed that they were exempt from the exhaustion requirement of $1415(1).6' 
The Seventh Circuit held that Charlie was not able to sue under $1983 for a violation of 
the IDEA without first exhausting the administrative procedures available under the IDEA. 
Although injunctive relief may no longer have been appropriate, the Court found that the 
administrative procedures available under the IDEA could still provide Charlie with appropriate 
relief in the form of school-funded counseling. Conceding that it is conceivable that the services 
available under the IDEA might prove less than satisfactory, and that damages in the end, may be 
the "only balm,"66 the Court held that this decision still cannot be fairly made without first going 
through the administrative procedures available under the  IDEA.^^ 
The Sixth and the Eighth Circuits, in addition to requiring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, have held that 1983 is not viable for those plaintiffs seeking monetary damages. The 
Sixth Circuit in CrocRer v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association held that although 
$1983 provided the plaintiff with an action that would otherwise have been foreclosed, "[slection 
1983 did not provide a right to damages where none existed before."68 Similarly, citing the 
analysis in Crocker, the Eighth Circuit in Heidemann v. Rother held that claims based upon 
violations of IDEA may not be pursued in a $ 1983 action "because general and punitive 
damages for the types of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs are not available under the  IDEA."^^ 
The different approaches taken by the circuit courts in deciding whether $1983 is 
available to plaintiffs suing for violations of IDEA is indicative of the courts' confusion as to 
what circumstances require the withdrawal of the $ 1983 remedy. Over the past twenty years the 
" 20 U.S.C. $ 1414(f) (Supp. V 1999) ("except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief 
that is also available under this part, the procedures under subsections ( f )  and (g) will be exhausted to the same 
extent as would be required had the action been brought under this part.") 
66 Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School District, 98 F.3d 989,993 (1996). 
67 1,i 
.-. 
'* 980 F.2d 382,387 (6' Ci. 1992). 
69 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8" Cir. 1996), 
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Supreme Court has refined a test to determine when $ 1983 should be made available to 
plaintiffs suing for enforcement of their federal statutory rights. Application of this test to the 
IDEA appears to resolve the question as to which of the approaches employed by the circuit 
courts is the correct one. An examination of the development of the $1983 test is necessary in 
making this decision. 
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Section 1983 has its roots in what is arguably our nation's earliest struggle for equality. 
Enacted in 1871 as part of $ 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, $ 1983 was originally created to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause?' In the post-Civil War era in which 
$1983 was passed, state officers and courts were either unable or unwilling to stop Afiican 
Americans from being deprived of their newly ratified civil rights?' Congress's enactment of $ 
1983 provided plaintiffs with a direct federal cause of action while altering "the relationship 
between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights."72 In 
allowing plaintiffs a means of bypassing state courts in order to have their federal rights 
vindicated, Congress created a means of ensuring that rights created under the Constitution and 
federal laws would not be trounced by state entities acting "under color" of state law. 42 U.S.C. 
$1983 provides, in relevant part, that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State. ..subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
70 42 Cong. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, (Potomac Publishing Co., Inc, 2003). 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 was titled as an Act "To 
enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes." 
See also, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,238 (1972) (describing the origins of 42 U.S.C. 1983.) 
71 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,240 (1972) ("state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals, 
either because the state courts were powerless to stop the deprivations [of citizens 14' Amendment rights] or were 
in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.") 
72 Id. 
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law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.73 
Despite its broad aspirations, 42 U.S.C. $1983 retained a relatively dormant status for 
decades after its enactment.74 It was not until the 1960's that suits under $1983 grew in 
popularity. This increase was largely due to two Supreme Court decisions that expanded the 
scope of $1983: Monroe v. pape7'and Maine v. T h i b o ~ t o t . ~ ~  
Monroe v. Pape, a suit involving unlawful police entry and arrest, expanded the 
definition of what it means to act "under color of law." Prior to Monroe this element of $1983 
had been defined as to include only those actions in which state actors had violated federal rights 
pursuant to official state In effect, this narrow construction of "under color of law" 
allowed state actors to violate federal and Constitutional rights as long as the state had 
established a law that prohibited the conduct engaged in. It was irrelevant, under this early 
interpretation, that the practice of the state agency may have been contrary to the official policy, 
that the law itself may have provided so little in way of remedies as to be ineffective, or that the 
law went unenfor~ed.~' Monroe expanded the definition of "under color" to include those 
actions in which the state actor violated Constitutional or federal rights while acting contrary to 
official state policy. As a result, states were no longer able to claim immunity for actions which 
violated federal and Constitutional rights by merely referencing a state statute that prohibited the 
behavior engaged in.79 
While Monroe enlarged the class of defendants subject to suit under $1983, it was not 
42 U.S.C. 1983 (2000). 
74 Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICnON, 6 8.2, (1989). 
"365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
76 448 U.S. 1 ,  (1980). 
77 Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, 68.3, (1989). 
78 Id. 
79 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,183 (1961). "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give 
relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be fust sought and refused 
before the federal one is invoked." 
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until the Supreme Court decided Maine v. ThiboutotsO that plaintiffs could clearly use $1983 to 
sue for violation of rights secured under statutes whose primary purpose was other than to 
establish civil rights. Lionel Thiboutot, the father of eight children including three from a prior 
maniage, sued for violation of his statutory rights as secured under the Social Security Act. 
Although legally responsible for all eight children, the Maine Department of Human Services 
refused to consider five children in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
benefits to which he was entitled." The Supreme Court of Maine found in favor of Thiboutot, 
finding that $1983 allows protection from violation of rights secured by the Constitution "and 
laws". The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed and held that the clear language of 
$1983 protected violations of rights secured under all laws, not simply those secured under civil 
rights statutes." 
Following the holdings in Monroe and Thiboutot, the door to $1983 litigation appeared, 
at first, to have been swung wide. Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, sought to narrow 
the apparent availability of $1983 to enforce any type of federal right." In Golden State Transit 
Corp. v. LOS ~ n ~ e l e s , ' ~  the Supreme Court clarified that plaintiffs seeking redress under $1983 
must claim a violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law. The test for 
determining whether a statute gives rise to a federal right, and hence, a plaintiffs valid use of 
$1983, has most recently been summarized by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone: 
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit 
the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right 
assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must 
U.S. 1, (1980). 
" Id. at 2. 
"Id. at 6-7. 
83 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles; Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority; 
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n; and Suter v. Artist M. as discussed hereafter. 
" 493 U.S. 103 (1989). 
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unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, 
the provision giving rise to the asserted ri t must be couched in 
mandatory, rather than precatory, terms. P 
If a statute fails to meet a single element of the Blessing test, the statute fails to confer a federal 
right that is enforceable under $1983.'~ 
A statute meeting all of the elements of the Blessing test may still not be enforceable 
through $1983, however. If a statute demonstrates, either expressly or implicitly, that Congress 
intended to foreclose a plaintiffs use of $1983, it may not be used to enforce the provisions of 
the statute. The Supreme Court has found access to $1983 to have been foreclosed in two cases: 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'nS7and Smith v. 
~ o b i n s o n . ~ ~  
The plaintiffs in Sea Clammers sought to enforce environmental protection laws against 
the defendant Sewerage Authority based upon an implied right of action. The defendant was 
alleged to have damaged fishing grounds by dumping raw sewage on the coast of New York and 
New Jersey in violation of several environmental protection laws. The Supreme Court, after first 
finding that the comprehensive structure and legislative history behind each statute precluded the 
implying of a private right of action, examined the statutes, sua sponte, to discern whether a 
89 . claim might be made under $1983. Finding that each of the statutes contained comprehensive 
enforcement mechanisms, the Court held that when "remedial devices provided in a particular 
Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to 
preclude the remedy of suits under $1983."~' 
In dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun noted that although the Court may presume 
Blessing, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (citations omitted). 
" Id at 341 ~ .... -.- . .. 
453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
88 468 U.S. 992,1011 (1984). 
89 453 U.S. 1,19 (1981). 
Id. at 20. 
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intent by Congress to foreclose remedial avenues other than those specifically provided for in the 
statute, this presumption of foreclosure can be rebutted by "express statutory language or clear 
references in the legislative hi~tory."~' Both statutes contain savings clause provisions which 
preserve the right of plaintiffs to pursue a remedy provided in any statute or under common law. 
While the majority concluded that the savings clause provisions "do not refer at all to a suit for 
redress of a violation of these statutes--regardless of the source of the right of action asserted,"92 
the dissent concluded that Congress could only have been more clear in its intent to preserve 
$1983 had it replaced the words "any statute" with 'L§1983."93 
A majority of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson similarly found the 
comprehensiveness of the administrative and judicial provisions set forth in IDEA to be 
indicative of Congressional intent to foreclose a plaintiffs use of $1983. In Smith, the Court 
found that a plaintiff who utilized $1983 would be able to circumvent the careful remedial 
procedures set forth in the ~ ta tu te?~  Such circumvention, the Court held, would defeat the 
purpose of a large part of the statute and was therefore clearly not an outcome desired by 
~ongres s?~  As discussed earlier:6 however, it remains disputed whether Congress intended to 
supersede this holding in Smith when it amended 20 U.S.C. $ 1415 to include a savings clause. 
The savings clause which Congress added provided that nothing within the procedural 
safeguards section of the Act was to be construed as limiting the rights, procedures, and remedies 
available under the Constitution, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, or any other Federal statute 
that seeks to protect the rights of children with disabilities. 
9' Id. at 28. 
92 Id. at 19. 
93 Id. at 29. 
%468 U.S. 992,1011-12 (1984). 
95 Id. 
% See supra Section LB. 
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The Supreme Court has not examined the issue of whether an action to remedy a 
violation of IDEA can be brought under $1983 since Congress amended the IDEA in 1986. The 
uncertainty over whether Congress, in amending the IDEA, sought to assure plaintiffs recourse 
to the remedies available through 5 1983 has resulted in a splintering of the federal circuitsg7. As 
the Supreme Court has thus far refused to grant certiorari to clear the c o n f ~ s i o n ~ ~ ,  a re- 
examination of the IDEA'S susceptibility to a $ 1983 claim is appropriate. 
N. Application of the Supreme Court's 5 1983 Test to the IDEA 
The analysis of whether a federal statute is susceptible to a cause of action under $1983 is 
two fold. First, the provision in question must be determined to confer a federal right upon an 
ind i~ idua l .~~  Second, if the provision within the statute confers a federal right, it must be 
determined whether Congress intended to foreclose access to $1983 by implicit or explicit 
means.'00 If the provision both confers a federal right, and Congress has not acted to preclude 
the use of $1983, that statute is enforceable through $1983. 
The Supreme Court has admonished that "only when the complaint is broken down into 
manageable analytic bites can a Court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various 
criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates right."lOl As a result, 
an analysis of whether a provision of IDEA satisfies the first prong of this two-part test requires 
examining whether a right is conferred by aparticular provision and not whether the statute as a 
whole conveys rights. For purposes of this analysis, I shall examine the most litigated provision 
of IDEA: whether IDEA guarantees a free and appropriate public education to individuals with 
97 See, supra Note 7 and accompanying text,. 
"See, e.g., Sellers by Sellers v. School Bd., 141 F.3d 524 (4& Cir., 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998). 
99 Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) ("First, the plaintiff must assert the violation 
of a federal right.") 
I W  Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,341 (1997) (discussing how congress may expressly or impliedly foreclose 
access to 5 1983). 
lo' Id. 
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disabilities ("FAPF'). 
A plaintiff suing for a violation of the IDEA under $ 1983 must assert the violation of a 
federal right and demonstrate that the use of $ 1983 has not been either explicitly or implicitly 
foreclosed. The Supreme Court summarized the three part inquiry in determining whether a 
provision in a statute confers a federal right upon the plaintiff as: (1) whether the provision is 
intended to benefit the plaintiff; (2) whether or not the right is so ''vague and amorphous" as to 
prevent judicial enforcement; and (3) whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the 
states. 
A statutory provision has been found to have been intended to benefit the plaintiff in two 
circumstances: when the language of the statute is "phrased in terms of the persons benefited"lo3 
and when the "provision in question was intended to benefit the putative plaintiff."1" While the 
former requirement has been used to find an implied right of action as well as $1983 claims, the 
latter requirement has only been used in determining $1983 claims. The distinction between the 
two requirements is subtle and best explained by example. 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago the Supreme Court explained that the determination 
of whether a provision is intended to benefit the plaintiff depends on whether the statute was 
enacted for the benefit of a particular class of which the plaintiff is a member as opposed to the 
benefit of the public at large.''* This determination, the Court held, could best be made by 
looking to the explicit "rights- or obligation-creating language" of the statute. The Court found 
that Title LX's provision that ""[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
Io2 Id. at 340-41. 
103 Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418,433 (1987), citing Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,692, n. 13 (1979). 
10d Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, (1989). 
I05 Cannon v. University of Chicago 441 U.S. 677,690 (1979). 
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any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" was clearly enacted to 
benefit a particular class of individuals-women. As a result, the provision was held to have 
been intended to benefit the plaintiff. 
In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass h,Io6 by contrast, the Supreme Court found a provision 
of the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act to meet the 51983 requirement that the statute 
benefit the plaintiffs. The provision in question required a state plan for medical assistance "to 
reimburse providers using rates (determined in accordance with methods and standards 
developed by the State ...) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the 
,1107 Secretary, are reasonable and adequate .... The state plan requirement, the Supreme Court 
noted, was "phrased in terms benefiting health care providers" and therefore met the 91983 
requirement.lo8 
The dissent in Wilder objected to the fact that the majority "looked beyond the 
unambiguous terms of the statute."lo9 Citing the title of the statute, "State plans for medical 
assistance," the dissent noted that the requirement that states reimburse providers using 
reasonable rates was just one in a series of conditions for receiving funds for medical 
assistance.l1° The dissent further found that the "absence in the statute of any express focus on 
providers as a beneficiary class of the provision" further buttressed the conclusion that the 
providers were not the beneficiaries of the statute."' 
The provision of a FAF'E can easily be held to benefit individuals with disabilities under 
the requirement posed by the majority in Wilder. More difficult to meet, however, is the dissent's 
I" 496 U.S. 498 (1990), 
I m  Id. at 502. 
I" ~ d .  at 510. 
I W  Id. at 526. 
"Old. at 527. 
' I '  Id. 
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requirement that the provision possess rights- or obligation-creating language. Section 1412 (a) 
provides that: 
"A state is eligible for assistance under this part.. . if the State demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the Secretary that the State has in effect policies and procedures to 
ensure that it meets each of the following conditions: (1) Free appropriate public 
education. (A) In general. A free appropriate public education is available to all 
children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, 
inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or 
expelled from school." 
The explicit language of the provision is much like the statute in Wilder. A distinguishing 
characteristic, however, clearly sets it apart: the title of the subsection and each of the conditions 
it imposes on the state are in furtherance of providing "Assistance for Education of All Children 
with ~isabilities.""~ While the language in Wilder merely referenced payment to providers as 
one of many conditions to receive funds for the broad "medical assistance" the provision of 
FAPE is one of many intended to further the goal of providing an education to all children with 
disabilities. Clearly then, Congress used obligation-creating language to further the rights of 
children with disabilities to a FAPE. 
While looking to the statutory provision to infer an intent to benefit the plaintiff can be 
helpful in deciding whether congress intended an enforceable right, the explicit grant of a right to 
enforce is even more persuasive. Section 1415 provides clear evidence of Congress's intent to 
benefit students with disabilities: "the parents.. .shall have an opportunity for an impartial due 
process hearing;""' and "shall have the right to bring a civil a~tion."''~ It would be nonsensical 
to grant a right of enforcement to a class of individuals unless those individuals are intended to 
benefit h m  the rights they can enforce. 
Finally, the intent to benefit students with disabilities is evident in the context of the 
"'20 U.S.C. $1412 (Supp. V 1999). 
II3ld. $81415 (f)(l). 
"'ld. $1415 (i)(Z)(A). 
Page 21 of 44 
statute as a whole. The Boren Amendment, which the Court in Wilder held as benefiting the 
providers of Medicaid services, was part of a larger statute whose purpose was to provide 
medical assistance to indigent The provision requiring states to provide FAPE to 
individuals with disabilitie~,"~ on the other hand is part of a larger statute the purpose of which 
is to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs and prepare them for employment and independent living."'" The clear focus on 
individuals with disabilities as a benefited class similarly buttresses the conclusion that Congress 
intended the provision of a FAPE to benefit them. 
The second element necessary in determining whether a statutory provision confers a 
federal right is whether or not the asserted right is so "vague and amorphous" that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence. In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and 
~ o u s i n ~  ~uthori ty"~,  the plaintiffs brought suit to enforce a Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) regulation based upon the Housing Act. The regulation required that the defendant charge 
no more for rent than a specified percent of a family's income."9 A "reasonable" allowance for 
utilities was included as rent. The defendants responded that a "reasonable" allowance for 
utilities was too vague a provision to be an enforceable right. The Supreme Court disagreed 
noting that the HUD regulations, which carried the force of law, were sufficiently specific and 
definite: they set forth guidelines by which the states should establish utility allowances and they 
required a notice and comment period for tenants prior to any change in the allowances. I20 In 
115 See, generally, 42 U.S.C. $8 1396a-1396e (1988). 
'I6 20 U.S.C. $1412 (Supp. V 1999). 
'I7 Id. 5 1400 (d)(l)(A). 
'''479u.S. 418 (1987). 
'I9 Id. at 420. 
I2O Id, at 431-432. 
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Wilder the Court elaborated to explain that allowing states the flexibility to choose among a 
variety of means by which to calculate the allowance did not render the provision so vague that it 
couldn't be enforced by a Court. 12' 
The requirement that states provide students with disabilities a free and appropriate 
public education is not so "vague and amorphous" as to strain judicial competence. First, states 
are clearly required to provide a FAPE to students with disabilities. Section 1412 (a)(l)lzz 
conditions a states receipt of federal funding under IDEA on that state having policies and 
procedures in place to ensure that children are provided a FAPE. Further, section 1413 provides 
that a State Educational Agency may not disburse federal funds to any school that fails to ensure 
a child is provided their rights under IDEA, including a FAPE.123 These provisions are 
unambiguous in their requirement that FAPE must be both procedurally and actually provided to 
children with disabilities. 
Second, the term 'free appropriate public education' is not so vague that a judge would be 
unable to enforce the provision. FAPE is defined as: "...special education and related services 
that.. .(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and 
without charge; (B) meets the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an 
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) 
are provided in conformity with the individualized education program.. ."Iz4 TO be enforceable, 
the provision of FAPE must be ascertainable by a judge.''' A judge may readily ascertain 
12' Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 519-20 (1990). 
Iz2 20 U.S.C. 5 1412 (a)(l) (Supp. V 1999). 
lZ3 Id. $1413 (i)(l). 
12' Id. $ 1401 (8). 
12' A maxim of administrative regulation is that administrative policies are best left to the administrative bodies 
familiar with them. Courts, on the other hand, should only review for compliance with established policy. The 
application of this maxim to judicial review of IDEA violations was fust shuck down in Board of Education v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,205 (1982), the fust Supreme Court decision to address the role of the courts in IDEA suits. 
According to Rowley, "we think the fact that it Ljudicial reviewlis found in 9 1415, which is entitled 'Procedural 
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whether a given education is 'free' and 'public'. More difficult to ascertain, however, is whether 
that education is appropriate. 
The first step a judge may take in determining whether an education is appropriate is to 
analyze whether it meets the clear language of the statute. The statutory definition provides that 
an appropriate education consists of special education and related services that are developed or 
determined necessary as the result of an individualized education program. Additionally, the 
educational program created must meet the standards of the State educational agency and extend 
to all levels of schooling: Preschool, Elementary, and secondary.lz6 An educational program 
failing to meet any of these requirements is clearly not appropriate. It is, however, still possible 
for a plan to be 'inappropriate' and yet comply with the procedures outlined in this definition. 
An inquiry into what is meant by 'appropriate' cannot be satisfactorily achieved by 
relying solely on the statutory definition: The very definition of FAPE relies on the word 
'appropriate."27 That IDEA does not define 'appropriate' is no reason to assert that the 
provision of a FAPE is 'vague and ambiguous,' however. Had Congress attempted to define 
'appropriate,' it would have resulted in an effect other than that which Congress intended in 
drafting this statute: a universal approach to the education of students with disabilities as 
opposed to an individualized one. The second step in analyzing whether an education is 
appropriate, therefore, requires looking at the structure of the statute as a whole in order to 
determine what Congress intended by 'appropriate'. 
The provisions of the IDEA provide sufficient guidance in determining what the outer 
safeguards,' is not without significance" "[we think this]demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate 
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in 
the way of substantive content in an IEP." Even with de novo judicial review that is largely limited to questions of 
procedural compliance, "The fact that $ 1415(e) requires that the reviewing cowt 'receive the records of the [state] 
administrative proceedings' carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these 
proceedings." In sum, concerns that judge's are free to create their own educational policy are misplaced. 
26 20 U.S.C. 5 1401 (8) (Supp. V 1999). 
127 Id. $1401 (8)(C). ("include an appropriate.. .education in the State involved.") 
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128. . - boundaries of an 'appropriate' education look like . ~t is an education that both parents and 
teachers believe will result in an educational benefit;Iz9 It is based on the needs and abilities of a 
child as determined by nondiscriminatory testing;I3O It is goal-oriented and measurable;13' It 
includes all necessary services that might enable a child to benefit fiom specially designed 
instruction;"* and it may be conducted in the home, a classroom, or other setting.I3' As was true 
of the regulations that provided guidance in the state's determination of what constituted 
'reasonable' in Wright, the provisions of IDEA provide ample guidance to a judge seeking to 
ascertain whether an 'appropriate' education has been 
The final element necessary to determine whether a provision confers a federal right is 
whether the statute unambiguously imposes a binding obligation upon the state. The Supreme 
Court has held spending legislation to be much in the way of a contract: the terms must be 
unambiguously stated in order to be enforced."' In Pennhurst v. Haldman the Supreme Court 
found that the Bill of Rights provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act did not unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the state. In making its 
determination the Court looked to both the statutory language and the type of legislation it was a 
part of. First, noting that the provision in question was merely a 'finding' by Congress and not a 
requirement, the Court held that the asserted rights indicated a simple federal preference rather 
than a federal mandate.'36 Next, the Court held that the statute did not provide for a withholding 
I" Seegenerally, note 125 supra. 
Iz9 Id. 6 1414(d). . ,
''O Id. $ 1414 (b) (3). Students are to be tested using nondiscriminatory or biased devices in order to evaluate the 
individual needs and determine appropriate strategies for addressing those needs. 
13' Id. $ 1414(d). 
Id. $1401 (22). 
13' Id. $1401 (25). 
'" 479 U.S. 418,431-32 (1987). 
I" Pennhu~st State School and Hospital v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
Id. at 19. 
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of federal monies if the state failed to comply with the Bill of Rights provision.'37 A provision in 
spending clause legislation that neither confers funds based solely upon compliance or withdraws 
funds for the same reason, Pennhurst held, is not 'binding' upon the state. Finally, the Court 
noted that the Act's stated purpose was to merely "assist" the states rather than fund the 
provision of new substantive rights.I3' 
The provision requiring states to provide children with disabilities a fiee and appropriate 
education is mandatory rather than precatory. The clear and unambiguous terms of spending 
legislation, once federal funding is accepted, are binding upon the state. Unlike Pennhurst, the 
provision of federal funding in IDEA is explicitly conditioned upon a state's adoption of a policy 
that ensures students with disabilities a free and appropriate edu~ation."~ A state cannot easily 
claim that the obligation to provide a free, appropriate public education was unknowingly thrust 
upon them. The requirement of FAPE is equally unambiguous: the boundaries of what 
determine a free and appropriate education, as discussed previously, are readily ascertainable 
from the structure of the statute. 
The procedural safeguards provisions of the IDEA also make clear that the adoption of a 
policy requiring FAPE is mandatory. Should a child not receive a FAPE, their parent or 
guardian may seek administrative and judicial redress through the statutorily mandated 
procedures. Further, the HCPA amendment specifically provides that students and parents with 
disabilities will not be limited in the remedies they might seek as a result of the  IDEA.'^' 
Clearly, the requirement of FAPE is mandatory and binding upon states that choose to accept 
137 Id. at 16-18. 
13* Id. at 18. 
139 20 U.S.C. $ 1412(1), 1412(2)(B) (Supp. V 1999). 
140 Id. $ I415 (1) ("Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies 
available under the Constihltion, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title v of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.") 
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federal funds under the IDEA. 
Once a plaintiff has demonstrated that the statutory provision in question meets the three 
requirements of the  lessi in^ testI4', a presumption exists that $1983 is available to them. This 
presumption may only be rebutted by a showing that Congress, in fact, intended to foreclose 
access to $1983. Courts can determine Congressional intent to foreclose a remedy under $ 1983 
either "expressly, by forbidding recourse to $ 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating 
a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under $ 
1983."142 Congress has only found statutoryprovisions to be so comprehensive as to foreclose 
access to $1983 in two cases: Sea Clammers and Smith v. ~obinson. '~ '  
The Court in Smith found two factors to be relevant in holding that Congress had sought 
to foreclose a plaintiffs access to $1983 when the underlying violation was one that fell within 
the ambit of rights provided under the IDEA. First, the Court found that the Act provided a 
carefully tailored means of administrative review that included access to a judicial proceeding 
upon exhaustion of these initial remedial means.'" Second, the Court noted that a petitioner 
could by-pass these initial administrative means by claiming a Constitutional violation of a right 
enforceable through the IDEA and initiating a suit under $ 1 9 8 3 . ' ~ ~  
The Court in Sea Clammers similarly found access to $1983 to have been foreclosed by 
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. The Court found that the remedial devices available 
through the statutes at issue would be by-passed if use of $1983 was permitted.'46 When specific 
remedies were provided for in the statute and a claim for damages was not one of them, the 
"I Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,340-341 (1997). 
Id. at 341. 
'43 See Part 111, inta. 
IM 468 U.S. 992.1011 (US. 1984). 
14' Id. at 1012-13. 
la 453 U.S. 1,20 (1981) ("It is hard to believe that congress intended to preserve the $1983 right of action when it 
created so many specific statutory remedies") 
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Court in Sea Clammers held that a separate suit for damages under $1983 was not what Congress 
intended.14' A savings clause in one of the statutes specified that the injunctive relief provided 
therein was not to be construed as preventing any other relief under "any other statute." This 
clause, Justices Stevens and Blackmun noted in dissent, should be construed as including access 
to $1983.'~' The majority Court, however, held that "any other statute" does not include $1983 
since the underlying claim would still be based on the statute within which the savings claim was 
Congress did not intend to foreclose a plaintiffs access to $1 983 for purposes of suing 
for a violation of IDEA. Although courts may rely on the comprehensiveness of the remedies 
provided in a statute in determining whether Congress intended to foreclose access to $ 1983, this 
reliance is only justified if Congress has not clearly spoken. In amending the IDEA, Congress 
clearly sought to reverse the Supreme Court's holding that $1983 may not me used to address 
violations of the IDEA: 
Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, 
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act, or other Federal statutes protecting the rights of 
handicapped children and youth, except that before the filing of a civil 
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this part, 
the procedures under subsection (b)(2) and (c) shall be exhausted to the 
same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this 
part.'50 
The legislative history of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act buttresses the 
conclusion that Congress, in amending the IDEA, intended to make clear that individuals with 
disabilities should have access to $1983 for violations of IDEA. In noting the above provision, a 
Joint Explanatory Statement clarifies, "[Bloth the Senate bill and the House amendment 
14' Id. 
Id. at 29. 
'"ld. at21. 
Is0 PLB. L. NO. 99-372,s 2, 100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
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authorize the filing of civil actions under legal authorities other than part B of the EHA to the 
same extent as would be required under that part.. . It is the conferees intent that actions brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are governed by this provision.'"' Further, Congress stated that this 
amendment was designed to "reestablish statutory rights repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Smith v. Robinson" and to ''reaffirm, in light of this decision, the viability of Section 504,42 
U.S.C. 1983, and other statutes as separate vehicles for ensuring the rights of handicapped 
children."'52 When Congress speaks with a clear voice, there is no need to infer intent. The 
clear language of the HCPA amendment and its legislative history make clear that Congress did 
not intend to withdraw a plaintiffs access to $1983 when it enacted the IDEA. 
V. Critique of the Circuit Split 
Section 1983 is available to plaintiffs suing for violations of the IDEA. Circuit courts 
that explicitly hold otherwise have incorrectly reasoned that Congress intended to foreclose 
access to $1983 by providing an elaborate administrative procedure that allows for redress. 
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have held $ 1983 to be foreclosed based upon four 
findings: (1) The procedures and remedies available under the IDEA are so comprehensive as to 
indicate an intent by congress to preclude enforcement by way of $1983; (2) The 1985 
amendment to IDEA did not preserve the use of $1983; (3) If legislative history might be 
construed as preserving access to $1983, such a construction is solely limited to access of $1983 
for violations of Constitutional rights; and (4) that the ambiguity regarding the availability of 
$1983 in the HCPA precludes its enforcement against the states.Is3 These findings are incorrect. 
In determining that Congress intended to foreclose access to $1983 for statutory 
violations of the IDEA by providing a comprehensive, administrative scheme, the Fourth and 
' 'I H.R. CONF. REP. 99-687 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., 1807, 1809. 
'" H.R. REP. NO. 99-296 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., 1798, 1799-1800. 
''3~ellers, 141 F.3d 524,530-31 (loLhCir. 1998). 
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Tenth Circuits chose to discount the actual wishes of Congress as expressed in the HCPA. When 
a court has established that a statute creates enforceable rights, a rebuttable presumption of the 
availability of $1983 arises.154 Courts need only look beyond this presumption when it is not 
clear whether Congress intended to foreclose access to $1983. The Court in Smith acknowledged 
this cannon of interpretation when it noted that it would have found $1983 to be an available 
remedy if Congress had "specifically indicated that it did not intend to limit the judicial remedies 
otherwise available to a handicapped The HCPA amendment, in response to Smith, 
provides, "Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures and 
remedies available under . ..federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped children.. . 9,156 
The Fourth and Tenth Circuits chose to look beyond Congress' clear response to Smith, 
however, and have instead held that Congress failed to preserve the use of $1983 by not 
expressly providing for it in the HCPA.'" Relying upon the fact that the amendment expressly 
provides for the preservation of rights remedies and procedures under the Constitution, the 
Rehabilitation Act, and "other Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped 
children ..."lS8 the Fourth and Tenth Circuits find the absence of $1983 to be telling. Further, 
they note that "other statutes protecting the rights of disabled children cannot naturally be read to 
include 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, a statute which speaks generally, and mentions neither disability nor 
youth."'s9 This reasoning is faulty in several respects. 
First, requiring Congress to afirmatively provide for $1983 is to "invert the established 
presumption that a private remedy is available under 5 1983 unless Congress has affirmatively 
IS4 Blessing, 520 U.S. 329,341 (1997). 
Is' Smith, 468 U.S. 992, 1013, n.16 (1984). 
IS6 PUB. L. NO. 99-372,s 2,100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
1s7~el lers ,  141 F.3d 524,530 (4Ih Ci. 1998); Padilla, 233 F.3d 1268, 13 (10' Cir. 2000). 
158 r#i .... 
I" Sellers, 141 F.3d 524,530 (4" Cir. 1998). 
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withdrawn the remedy."'60 Second, even though Congress need not affirmatively provide for the 
use of $1983, the HCPA does in fact provide for $1983 when it affirms the availability of "other 
Federal statutes"I6' that protect the rights of children with disabilities. Congress, in specifying 
the Constitution and the Rehabilitation Act, was merely listing sources that confer enforceable 
rights to children with disabilities. To include $ 1983 in this grouping, a statute conferring no 
substantive rights, would have been anomalous. Instead, Congress concluded the sentence with 
the disjunctive 'or'162 followed by "other Federal statutes protecting the rights of handicapped 
children and youth.. ."I6' Section 1983, a statute created to protect and enforce civil rights, 
clearly matches this description. This assertion is bolstered by the 1997 amendment to the IDEA 
where Congress amended its list of rights-creating sources to include the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). Had Congress meant to merely encompass other rights-creating statutes 
when it presewed "other Federal statutes", the addition of the ADA would have been mere 
surplussage. 
Next, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits assert that the legislative history of the HCPA 
amendment is consistent with their interpretation that $1983 is not available for statutory 
violations of the IDEA. House Conference Report 99-687 provides, "It is the conferees' intent 
that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are governed by this provision."'64 Rather than 
construing this statement in its most natural fashion, the Tenth and Fourth Circuits have unduly 
limited the legislative history to comport with their interpretation of the HCPA amendment: that 
any reference to $1983 could only refer to an intent by Congress to preserve a plaintiffs access 
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,376 (1992). Internal citations omitted. 
16' PUB. L. NO. 99-372,G 2,100 Stat. 796 (1986). (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). 
162 Sellers, 141 F.3d 524,530 (4' Cir. 1998).The Sellers Court, in analyzing the HCPA amendment, fails to note the 
importance of the disjunctive connecting the sources conferring federal rights and "other" statutes, incorrectly 
phrasing the analysis as follows, "But while section 1415(f) explicitly preserves remedies under the Constitution, the 
Rehabilitation Act, and specified "other" statutes, it simply fails to mention Section 1983." (emphasis added). 
163 Id 
I 6 4  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-687, at 7 (1986), reprintedin 1986U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807,1809. 
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to the rights and remedies of the Constitution, not as a vehicle for remedying statutory violations 
of the IDEA. The Circuit courts' narrowing of the clear conference report statement is not 
supported by either the legislative history or the statutory language; the opinions of the circuits 
similarly fail to provide support for their narrowing of the conferees' clear statement. Such 
unsupported opinions should be entitled to little, if any, weight. 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit points to Pennhurst's clear statement rule to support its 
holding that $1983 is not available to plaintiffs suing for statutory violations of the IDEA. 
Pennhurst requires obligations that are imposed pursuant to the spending power to be 
unambiguously stated in order to be held enfor~eab1e.I~~ The Fourth Circuit, finding the language 
of HCPA to be ambiguous in its response to Smith, construed this holding to likewise prevent the 
use of $1983 in suits based upon statutory violations of IDEA. A crucial difference that the 
Fourth circuit overlooks, however, is that the issue in Pennhurst was whether an implied right of 
action might be found to enforce alleged rights that were phrased in precatory rather than 
mandatory terms. Second, even had the language of HCPA not been plain, the issue in 
Pennhurst is quite distinguishable from that in the debate of whether $1983 is available for 
statutory violations: Pennhurst concerns the grave issue of holding a state responsible for 
ensuring an ambiguously imposed substantive right after that state has unwittingly agreed to 
accept federal funding in exchange for fulfilling the obligations laid out in the federal statute. 
Quite differently, whether or not $1983 is available to plaintiffs is not purely an issue of whether 
substantive rights exist, but rather whether rights plainly set forth in the statute may be enforced 
by application of a civil rights statute. Additionally, as the application of $1983 to federal laws 
commenced prior to the implementation of  IDEA,'^^ it is unlikely that a state can claim that it 
~ennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,2 (1980). 
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lacked notice of the enforceability of substantive federal rights by means of $1983 when it 
accepted federal funding. 
Still, the Fourth Circuit claims that it is Congress's duty to affirmatively set forth a 
plaintiffs right to use $1983 since the Court in Smith ruled that other laws were not available to 
plaintiffs who had claims that might properly be addressed by the remedies set forth in the 
IDEA. Even had the holdings of Pennhurst been applicable to the issue of whether $1983 is 
available, the intent of Congress to allow suits for statutory violations of the IDEA under $1983 
is clear. As discussed previously, HCPA's use of a disjunctive between the sources from which 
an enforceable right can be found and the statutes that merely serve to protect those substantive 
rights clearly indicates Congressional intent to allow the use of $1983. 
VI. What Gonzaga v. Doe Adds 
A relatively recent Supreme Court case, Gonzaga v. Doe, has the potential to shift the 
foregoing conception of the IDEA and its relation to $1983 claims. John Doe, the plaintiff in 
Gonzaga v. Doe, was a graduating student in the college of education at Gonzaga University. 
Upon graduating from Gonzaga, Doe intended to teach at an elementary school in Washington. 
In order to obtain certification to teach in Washington, Doe was required to provide an affidavit 
from his graduating school that attested to his good moral character. One of the defendants, 
Roberta League, held the position of certification specialist at John Doe's college. League 
learned from another student that Doe had engaged in sexual misconduct with another student. 
Upon further investigation, the defendant decided that she would not grant Doe the required 
affidavit. The defendant then proceeded to call the state certification agency, identify the plaintiff 
by name, and discuss the allegations that prompted her decision with the agency. Doe brought 
suit under $1983 against the University and League, alleging that the defendants acted in 
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violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) by releasing his 
educational information without his or his parents' consent.I6' 
The Washington trial court, following half of the circuit courts, found in favor of Doe and 
awarded relief based upon Doe's $1983 claim. The Washington Court of Appeals, however, 
chose to follow the other half of the circuits in regard to whether FEWA granted rights 
enforceable by way of $1983, and reversed the trial court decision.16' The Washington Supreme 
Court, in turn, reversed the appellate court finding, noting that while FERPA as a whole does not 
create enforceable rights, the FERPA provision relied upon by the plaintiff was amenable to 
enforcement under $1983. Noting both the conflict in the circuits regarding whether $1983 was 
available to causes of action based on violations of FEWA as well as the ambiguity of its own 
previous $1983 decisions, the Supreme Court granted certiora~i. '~~ 
a. Holdings of Gonzaga 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the plaintiffs assertion that the 
FERPA provision at issue'70 conferred individually enforceable rights. The Chief Justice made 
three key findings in reaching this decision. First, he noted that the Court has only rarely found 
spending clause legislation to confer enforceable rights.I7' Second, the Chief Justice held that in 
order to bring an action under 5 1983, Congress must have unambiguously intended to provide 
the plaintiff with an enforceable right.ln Third, and relatedly, the Chief Justice held that the 
inquiry used to determine whether an enforceable right exists in an implied right of action suit 
16' 536 U.S 273,276 (2002) (relaying the facts of the case). 
Id. at 278. 
lS9 Id. .... 
Irn 20 U.S.C. $1232g(b)(l). 'Wo funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational 
agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the releaseof education records (or personally 
identifiable information contained therein.. .) of students without the written consent of their parents to any 
individual, agency or organization." 
171 Conraga, 536 U.S. 273,280. 
Id. at 283. 
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should also be used to determine whether a plaintiff may sue under $1983.'~' 
Chief Justice Rehnquist began by noting that only twice since Pennhurst had the Court 
found spending clause legislation to give rise to enforceable rights.'74 Distinguishing those 
provisions which gave rise to enforceable rights in Wilder and Wright from the provision in 
FERPA, the Chief Justice noted that the former explicitly conferred monetary entitlements upon 
the plaintiffs'7' while the latter merely stated a condition that the Secretary of Education was 
obligated to enf~rce.'~~-~dditionall~, the Chief Justice noted that in its more recent decisions, 
those of Suter and Blessing, the Court had "rejected attempts to infer enforceable rights from 
Spending Clause statutes."'77 Emphasizing the restrictive holdings of Pennhurst and Suter, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist reiterated that Congress must unambiguously confer an individual right, not 
merely provide the Secretary with a standard by which to measure a state's compliance.'78 
The Chief Justice next responded to the plaintiffs argument that prior Supreme Court 
decisions had found rights enforceable by $1983 when Congress had simply demonstrated an 
intent to benefit the plaintiff. 17' Admitting that past opinions might suggest that "something less 
than an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by $1983 ," '~~  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
'"Id.; If a wurt fmds a stahlte to create an implied right of action, a plaintiff may sue for violations of that statute 
despite being granted no express right of action. The test for determining whether an implied right of an action may 
be found was most succinctly stated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (1975): "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class 
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' - that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the 
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to 
deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for 
the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the 
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 
This test was modified in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,286 (2001)(citations ommited) to also require that 
Congress "display[ ] an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy." Application of the implied 
ri hts inquiry to the $ 1983 inquiry significantly raises the bar on what plaintiffs must prove to establish standing. 1 3  Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273,280. 
Id. at 280. 
I" Id. at 279. 
''' Id. at 281. 
17' Id. at 281. 
'19 Id. at 282. 
Id. at 320. 
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stated that the Court "now reject[s] the notion that our cases permit anyhng short of an 
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under $1983."'8' 
Further responding to the plaintiffs concerns that a "more 'rigorous' inquiry would 
conflate the standard for inferring a private right of action under $ 1983 with the standard for 
infemng a private right of action from the statute itse~f,""~ Chief Justice Rehnquist held that 
"our implied right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers 
rights enforceable under $1983."1s3 As a result, he continued, the tests for determining whether a 
private right of action can be implied and whether a statutory violation may be enforced through 
$1983 "overlap in one meaningful respect - in either case we must first determine whether 
Congress intended to create a federal right."lp4 
Analyzing the FERPA statute under the clear and unambiguous standard articulated by 
the Chief Justice, the majority found that the provision created state obligations to an aggregate 
of its citizens and did not contain the individual rights-creating language required to support an 
action under $1983.'*' Further, it noted that FERPA explicitly authorized the Secretary of 
Education to enforce the statute and that the Secretary, in turn, created an office to investigate 
individual ~o rn~1a in t s . I~~  Such administrative procedures, the Court held, "squarely distinguish 
this case fiom Wright and Wilder where an aggrieved individual lacked any federal review 
mechanism.. .and further counsel against our finding congressional intent to create individually 
enforceable private rights."18' 
Concumng in the judgment but questioning the majority's textual emphasis was Justices 
''I Id. at 321. 
Id. at 320. 
Id. at 32 1 . 
Id. 
''' Id. at 287. 
Id. at 289. 
18' Id. at 290. 
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Breyer and Souter. Breyer found that the broad language of the FERPA provision provided too 
little guidance to schools about the nature of their obligations to be considered enforceab~e.'~~ He 
agreed with the majority that an evaluation of multiple factors, as expressed in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion, pointed to a lack of intent by Congress to allow private enforcement 
a ~ t i 0 n s . l ~ ~  Justice Breyer disagreed, however, with the majority's reliance on, what he 
characterized to be a purely textual test to determine congressional intent: "I would not, in effect, 
pre-determine an outcome through the use of a presumption - such as the majority's presumption 
that a right is conferred only if set forth 'unambiguously' in the statute's 'text and stru~ture.""~ 
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsberg joins, wrote a two part dissenting opinion. 
In part one, Justice Stevens analyzes the FERPA provision according to the three part test 
articulated in Blessing v. Freestone and finds that it creates an enforceable right. In part two 
Justice Stevens questions the majority's decision to import the implied right of action inquiry 
into the $1983 analysis. 
Justice Stevens first breaks from the majority in deciding how to analyze the provision at 
issue. While the majority focused solely on the provision at issue, Justice Stevens notes that a 
'blanket approach' to questions of enforceability by $1983 is not Instead, he 
draws his findings from reading the provision in light of the entire statute. Justice Stevens 
quickly finds the majority's assertion that FERPA "'entirely lacks" rights-creating language"'92 
to be erroneous. On the contrary, the statute is replete with specific references to 'rights.' Justice 
Stevens next takes issue with the majority's findings that the provision speaks only to an 
Is8 Id. at 292. 
IS9 id. 
Id. at 29 1 .  
19' Id. at 294. 
192 Id. at 296. 
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aggregate and cannot, therefore, convey individual rights.I9' By focusing on the contingent 
phrase "so long as" in the statutory provision, Justice Stevens finds that $1232g(b) doesn't 
simply outright ban a practice, rather it conditions a practice on an individual student's parents 
action.'94 Because it is the individual student's parents who must perform the action, Justice 
Stevens finds the provision to be individually focused. Even were it not, however, Stevens 
asserts that the simple fact that a provision conditions relief on apolicy or practice is not 
preclusive of an individual right to enf~rcement.'~' 
Turning to the factors outlined in the Blessing test, Justice Stevens notes that the right at 
issue in FERPA "plainly meets the standards we articulated.. .for establishing a federal right."'96 
Additionally, Stevens notes, the right claimed in the FERPA provision is even more clear and 
unambiguous than those rights held to be enforceable by $1983 in both Wright and WiIder.I9' 
Stevens finishes his $1983 analysis by examining FERPA to determine whether Congress 
intended to specifically withdraw the remedy of $1983. Holding that Congress demonstrated no 
such intent, he first concludes that FERPA creates a privately enforceable right and then directs 
his attention to the $1983 analysis employed by the majority. 
In part two of the dissent, Justice Stevens criticizes the majority's importation of the 
implied right of action inquiry into the $1983 context. First, he observes that the separation of 
powers concerns that warrant a more searching review of whether Congress intended to create a 
privately enforceable right are not present in the $1983 context.19* While implied right of action 
cases "reflect a concern. ..that Congress rather than the courts control the availability of remedies 
'93 Id. at 295. 
Id. 
19= Id. 
'%Id. at 295. 
19' Id. at 295. 
'"Id. at 300. 
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for violations of statutes,"'99 the fact that Congress specifically authorized private actions in 
enacting $1983 alleviates the Court of that concern. 
Justice Stevens next notes that the use of implied right of action precedent in the $1983 
context results in the new requirement that Congress must specifically intend to make the right 
enforceable under $ 1 9 8 3 . ~ ~ ~  This is unavoidable, Justice Stevens contends, given that past 
implied rights decisions "do not necessarily cleanly separate out the 'right' question from the 
'cause of action' question."201 Such a new requirement, he adds, conflicts directly with the 
established presumption that $1983 is available to all plaintiffs filing suit for violation of a 
federal right202 
In conclusion, Stevens observes that the Court's decision to meld the 'is there a right' 
inquiry with the 'is it enforceable' inquiry, as demonstrated in its question of whether "Congress 
rr 203 nonetheless intended private suits to be brought.. . and its reliance on implied right of action 
decisions, places an unwarranted higher burden on the plaintiff 
b. Implications for the Circuit Split 
The Gonzaga decision may greatly affect the way $1983 claims based on violations of 
the IDEA are decided. Circuits that have found $1983 to be available to plaintiffs suing for 
violations of the IDEA have based their decision on the 1986 amendment to the IDEA and its 
legislative history. Circuits ruling against the use of $1983 for statutory violations of the IDEA 
hold that the amendment doesn't explicitly reference $1983 and that any discussion regarding 
$1983 in the legislative history pertains only to the pursuit of Constitutional claims that mir~or 
those that might be brought under the IDEA. Both sides of the debate have primarily analyzed 
199 Id. 
'"1d. at301. 
201 Id. at 301. 
Id. at 302. 
m3 Id. 
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the availability of $1983 under the second part of the $1983 inquiry: whether or not Congress 
foreclosed the use of $1983. The decision in Gonzaga, however, may prompt courts to begin 
analyzing $1 983 claims based upon the IDEA under the newly modified first part of the $1 983 
inquiry: whether Congress unambiguously conferred a "right to support a cause of action 
brought under $1983."~'~ 
Courts that have analyzed whether $1983 is available for claims based upon statutory 
violations of the IDEA have not analyzed whether the statutory provision at issue conveys 
enforceable rights. It is likely that a majority of these courts have relied upon the Supreme 
Court's statement in Smith, that "the Act establishes an enforceable substantive right to a free 
appropriate public education required by the stat~te,"~'' to be conclusive as to whether IDEA 
creates an enforceable right to a FAPE."~ AS the dissent in Gonzaga noted, however, the 
majority's conflation of the implied right of action inquiry with the $ 1983 inquiry sub silentio 
overrules cases such as Wilder and Wright where the provisions at issue, like the provisions in 
the IDEA, "did not 'clearly and unambiguously' ... intend enforceability under $1983."207 
The majority opinion in Gonzaga announced that "Since Pennhurst, only twice have we 
found spending legislation to give rise to enforceable rights."208 The two decisions the Court then 
cites does not include Smith v. Robinson among them. If Pennhurst was decided three year 
before Smith and yet Smith is not included in the Supreme Court's exceptions, it seems safe to 
conclude that the Supreme Court does not consider itself to have held the IDEA, a statute created 
pursuant Congress' spending power, to have given rise to enforceable rights. The Supreme Court 
'M id. at 283. 
'O5 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992,1010 (1984). 
2W As noted earlier, a majority of the federal court cases filed allege violations of a FAPE. 
207 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273,300 (2002)(emphasis in original). 
id. at 280 (2002). 
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"is bound by holdings, not language"209 and "questions which merely lurk in the record, neither 
brought to the attention of the Court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so 
decided as to constitute If Smith did not hold the IDEA to create substantive 
enforceable rights in the $1983 context and the test for determining whether an enforceable right 
exists has changed with the advent of Gonzaga, it appears likely that the Supreme Court, and 
lower courts, can evaluate anew whether the IDEA's provisions confer enforceable rights. 
Many of the IDEA'S most litigated provisions are troublingly similar to those in the 
disputed FERPA provision.2" The FERF'A provision at issue in Gonzaga conditions federal 
funding upon a finding that the educational agency does not have a "policy or practice of 
permitting the release of education records of students.. ."2'2 Similarly, the IDEA conditions 
funding upon a finding that the state has in effect "policies and procedures" to ensure that it 
meets each of the following conditions: ...[ a] Free Appropriate Public  ducati ion."^'^ Also 
similar to the FERF'A provision at issue in Gonzaga, the majority of the IDEA's provisions lack 
the clear rights-creating language that the majority in Gonzaga held to be key in finding rights to 
be enforceable under $1983. If, as Justice Breyer contends, the majority opinion requires the text 
and structure of the statute to squarely provide the plaintiff with an enforceable right, only 
$1415, a provision that allows suit based upon the violation a student's right to a FAPE, may be 
able to pass the Gonzaga test. Evaluated as part of spending clause legislation, however, this 
lone provision may equally be jeopardized as the result of Gonzaga. 
The majority in Gonzaga takes pains to emphasize that statutes passed pursuant to 
209 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,282 (2001). 
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507,511 (1925). 
2" See, e.g., notes 187 and 188 infra. 
212 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273,279 (2002). 
'" 42 U.S.C. 9 1412 (a) (2003). 
Page 41 of 44 
Congress' spending power are especially disfavored in the $1983 context.214 The IDEA, like 
FERPA, is a spending clause statute. The majority in Gonzaga stresses that the two suits that 
have been allowed since Pennhurst, both of which were premised on violations of spending 
clause statutes, were only allowed because "Congress spoke in terms that 'could not be 
clearer."'21s Responding to the plaintiffs assertion that "this line of ~ases"~" establishes a 
federal right as long as Congress intended that the statute benefit the plaintiff, the Supreme 
Court, states that, "we now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an 
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under $1983."'" This 
heightened requirement, that a statute must expressly state a right to a cause of action under $ 
1983, is not expressed in any other context in the remainder of the Court's opinion. 
One interpretation that can be drawn fiom this statement might be that it applies only to 
the type of cases being discussed in that particular section of the provision--Spending Clause 
legislation. If hue, spending legislation, perhaps because it "is much in the nature of a 
  on tract,""^ must expressly state that $ 1983 is available to plaintiffs filing suit upon these 
statutes. No clause in the IDEA, including $1415, expressly states that $ 1983 is available to 
plaintiffs suing for violations of the IDEA. 
Prior to Gonzaga, the majority of the circuits held that $ 1983 was available to plaintiffs 
seeking redress for violations of the IDEA. The two circuits that clearly opposed such a finding, 
the Tenth and Fourth, based their decisions on a misinterpretation of the statutory language 
214 See, e.g. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273,279-281 (2002). ("Since Pennhurst only twice have we found spending 
legislation to give rise to enforceable rights" and "Our most recent decisions, however, have rejected attempts to 
infer enforceable rights fiom Spending Clause statutes.") 
'I5 Id. at 280 (2002). 
2'6 Id. at 282.(refe-g to $1983 decisions of rights alleged in spending clause statutes) 
'"1d. at 283. 
218 Pennhurst State School &Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). (refusing to fmd an enforceable right 
where the alleged right was not clear enough to be enforced as part of a contract). The Supreme Court, however did 
not explain its reasoning in Gonzaga. 
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contained in the HCPA. Upon a broad reading of Gonzaga, however, the Tenth and Fourth 
circuits may now successfi~lly shift their analysis to the first part of the 5 1983 inquiry and 
continue to hold that § 1983 is not available for statutory violations of the IDEA. Gonzaga, in 
sum, has great potential to reverse the current circuit court split over whether 5 1983 is available. 
VII. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court's decision in Gonzaga has the potential to prevent parents of students 
with disabilities from suing under § 1983 for violations of the IDEA. In the absence of 3 1983, 
parents and students will be forced to rely upon the administrative procedures2'9 and remedieszz0 
provided by local and state educational agencies. Although the federal government may withhold 
federal hnding for violations of the IDEA, the severity of this remedy and the consequences it 
has on the intended beneficiaries of the statute, will likely prevents its use. 
Congress is, of course, at liberty to amend the IDEA to clarify that 5 1983 is available to 
plaintiffs. Requiring Congress to specifically provide for 3 1983 does little, however, except to 
delay the ability of parents and children whose rights have been violated to obtain the 
appropriate relief they deserve and make Congress take additional, needless steps to reaffirm its 
original intent. It does not better enable states to make informed decisions when evaluating 
spending legislation because states accept Spending Clause legislation against the backdrop of 5 
1983.'~' It does not further the goal of preventing federal commandeering of the states by way of 
private suits for money damages;222 the IDEA explicitly requires exhaustion of state 
2'9 Individuals who are not made aware of their right to the administrative remedies under the IDEA until after those 
remedies are no longer sufficient or available will, however, have no means of redress. 
220 If the current case law does not provide an adequate remedy, however, parents and students will be left without 
redress. 
22' Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to 
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation." 
222 See generally. Michael S.  Greve, Business. The States, and Federalism's Political Economy, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 895,913 (2002) ("When the average mayor or governor thinks of 'commandeering,' what comes to his 
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administrative procedures. Finally, it does not further separation of powers concerns since 
Congress crafts legislation against the backdrop of $ 1983. The only thing that it may do quite 
well is alleviate the burden currently placed on courts to determine whether every provision of 
every statute confers an enforceable right. It is not immediately apparent, however, that the 
convenience enjoyed by the courts will be enough to outweigh the intermediate harm suffered by 
plaintiffs suing, without adequate remedy, for violations of Spending Clause statutes. 
mind is not the rare direct federal intervention of the sort at issue in New York v. United States and Printz v. U ~ t e d  
States but rather a private lawsuit under $ 1983.") 
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